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YUGO

INFLATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA
-Munich, 8 August 1989 (RAD/David Goodlett)
Summary: Ethnic strike .and decentralization have
prevented
the
Yugoslav
authorities
from
overcoming rising inflation.
The ex.ample of
Yugoslavia as a model for economic reform is an
instructive
and
worrisome
one
for other
countries in Eastern Europe.

* * *
At a time when the government and other politicians in the
Soviet Union are speaking with trepidation about' the prospect of
an explosion in prices and when in Poland, where food prices
have recently tripled, this fear has become a reality, Yugoslav
inflation continues to soar. The latest official figure puts it
at almost 790%. 1 Even this figure, however, does not convey the
full reality ·: it has been reported, 2
for example,
that
Yugoslavs are now bundling up dinar notes and trading their
weight for hard currency. Despite repeated assertions by various
, Yugoslav public officials · over the past few months that they
were on the verge of halting inflation, neither the previous
government of Branko Mikulic ·nor the current one under Ante
Markovic has shown any ability to do so. The reasons for this
failure say much about Yugoslavia's difficulties in instituting
market reforms and present a grim picture for the Poles and
Soviets to contemplat:e:
Yugoslavia, like Poland, is
suffering from the heavy
borrowing of the 1960s and 1970s. Its current external debt,.
though it has decreased somewhat, still exceeds $19 billion. A
rapidly declining standard of living has accompanied
the
country's attempts to service this debt. Political pressure on
the government to do something about the situation has forced i t
to accept the demands of the World Bank and the International
Monetary
Fund
that
the Yugoslav
economy
become
more
market-oriented.

As a result, for quite some time Yugoslav politicians have
almost all at least paid lip-service to the principle of
economic reform.
No matter what part of the country they
represent or their ideological affiliation, these politicians
all maintain that the economy must be freed from bureaucratic
and party interference. There have consequently been a number of
moves to increase private ini~iative, including the setting up
of more joint ventures; the elimination of many restrictions on
foreign-owned businesses; and slightly greater flexibility in
dealing with the work force.
Nevertheless, these and other
reforms, together with concurrent attempts to rein in state
spending, have so far done little to bring down inflation.
The cause of
this
ineffectiveness,
besides
residual
bureaucratic and ideological inertia, lies principally with the
decentralized system created by Josip Broz Tito, a system that
in essence established a series of ethnically-based separate
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republics within a formal Yugoslav federation.
By placing
political and economic power in the hands of the governments of
the various republics,
control
was
shifted but did not
disappear; it . was merely transf~rred to the regional level.
Therefore, instead of
one
centraliz·e d
party · · and state ·
bureaucracy directing and deadening the economy, Yugoslavia has
multiple smaller bureaucracies competing against one another for •slices of the federal pie. It is in the interests ·of the
officials of these republican agencies to get as much money as
possible from the federal treasury, because their dispersal of
these funds is the source of their power and position.

;

Decentralization has thus had two main effects: it has
increased the sense of ethnic identification of the people in
the republics and provinces; and it has prevented the central
government, which exerts limited influence at . best in the
republics, from controlling public expenditures. The inevitable
upshot is an inability to control price rises.
The principal task that the Markovic government set for
itself when it took office in March 1989 was the halting of
~nflation. At that time the inflation rate was less than 400%.
The government has continued to speak optimistically about
overcoming the problem by the
end of the year, but such
assertions have recently been tempered with caution.
For
instance, on June 1 YUgoslav Trade Minister Nazmi Mustafa said
that _ it would take "maximum liberalization" to correct the
problem. 3 The only hope for such a radical policy lies with the
Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
in December. Nonetheless, nobody can realistically expect the
Yugoslav
politicians
to
overcome their
deep
divisions
sufficiently to tackle such an immense problem as inflation.
Over the past year there has been increasing opposition
from Croatia and
especially
Slovenia
to
rising Serbian
nationalism and to its champion, the Serbian State President
Slobodan Milosevic.
In addition,
changes in some of the
republican leadership and conflicting advice from the ultimate
arbiter, the army, have added to the sense of uncertainty in the
country.
Furthermore, in early July the plan presented by the
_Markovic government to
restrain
the
budget was blocked
temporarily by Serbia, which argued that the cuts fell too
heavily on the poorer areas of Yugoslavia.
On July 14 Serbia
did finally approve the budget with some upward revisions. This
exemplifies the political morass from which the LCY congress
must extricate Yugoslavia in order to pry the economy loose from
excessive bureaucratic control over spending.
Any country that has similar problems must view the
Yugoslav situation with concern. Poland can, perhaps, take some
comfort in the fact that Yugoslavia's inflation rate has not yet
caused widespread civil unrest. The Kremlin, however, which
confronts a potential nationalities crisis even greater than
Yugoslavia's, must regard with some anxiety the prospect of
(k-0~)
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erode the cohesion of the state.
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Vjesnik (Zagreb) , 28 June 1989.

2

vecernje Novosti (Belgrade), 26 June 1989.

3

Tanjug, 1 June 1989.
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